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BUCKING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: 
RUSSIA’S UNILATERAL “SUSPENSION” OF 
THE CFE TREATY 
INTRODUCTION 
he Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (“CFE 
Treaty”) is a seminal arms control agreement between the member 
states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) and the for-
mer Warsaw Pact.1 Signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, and having 
entered into force on November 9, 1992, the Treaty established the re-
duction of troop and armament levels throughout Europe based on a sys-
tem of parity.2 Frequently described as “the cornerstone of European se-
curity,” the CFE Treaty facilitated the demobilization of “more than 
60,000 battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft 
and attack helicopters.”3 On July 14, 2007, President Vladimir Putin an-
nounced that the Russian Federation was unilaterally “suspending” its 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 6 
(1991), available at http://www.osce.org/documents/doclib/1990/11/13752_en.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2008) [hereinafter CFE Treaty]. NATO, currently with twenty-six mem-
ber states, is a collective security alliance that was established on April 4, 1949 with the 
signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO Web site, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.nato.int/issues /faq/index.html#A1 (last visited Apr. 12, 2008). The States 
Parties to the CFE Treaty who are NATO members are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portu-
gal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. See supra 
CFE Treaty at 1; NATO Web site, NATO Member Countries, http://www.nato.int/ 
structur/countries.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2008). The Warsaw Pact was a competing 
military alliance that formed on May 14, 1955, and was officially dissolved on July 1, 
1991. See generally AN INSIDE HISTORY OF THE WARSAW PACT, 1955–1991: 
DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CARDBOARD CASTLE? (Vojtech Mastny et al. eds., 
2005), available at http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id= 
15697. The former Warsaw Pact countries who are States Parties to the CFE Treaty were: 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (“USSR”). See CFE Treaty supra at 1; Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance, May 14, 1955, 219 U.N.T.S. 3, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/soviet/warsaw.htm. 
 2. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Fact Sheet: Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (June 18, 2002), http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls 
/fs/11243.htm. 
 3. Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty, Background, 
http://www.osce.org/conferences/cfe_2007.html?page=24854 (last visited Apr. 25, 2008) 
[hereinafter CFE Treaty Background]. 
T 
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participation in the CFE Treaty.4 Russia’s suspension officially went into 
effect on December 12, 2007.5 
Russia’s decision to suspend its implementation of the CFE Treaty 
came in the midst of a period of rising tensions in its relations with the 
West. Ahead of the G8 summit in June 2007, President Putin threatened 
to aim Russia’s missiles at Europe if the United States proceeded with 
plans to install a missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Repub-
lic.6 In late July 2007, the United Kingdom expelled four Russian diplo-
mats for Moscow’s failure to cooperate in the investigation of the murder 
of former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko; three days later, the Rus-
sian Foreign Ministry responded in kind, expelling four British diplo-
mats.7 In August 2007, Russian Air Force bombers resumed long-range 
sorties over the world’s oceans, a Cold War-era practice that had been 
discontinued in the early 1990s.8 
Russia’s announcement of its “suspension” of CFE Treaty participation 
is reminiscent of the United States’ notification of its withdrawal from 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (“ABM Treaty”) in December 2001.9 
The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty inspired much international 
legal scholarship.10 Referring to the highly political—rather than legal—
                                                                                                             
 4. See President of Russia, Information on the Decree “On Suspending the Russian 
Federation’s Participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and 
Related International Agreements” (July 14, 2007), http://kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2007/ 
07/137839.shtml [hereinafter Suspension Announcement]. 
 5. See Statement by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding Suspension by 
Russian Federation of Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) 
(Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/ 
10da6dd509e4d164c32573af004cc4be?OpenDocument [hereinafter December Russian 
MFA Statement]. 
 6. Luke Harding, The New Cold War: Russia’s Missiles to Target Europe, THE 
GUARDIAN, June 4, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/ 
0,,2094839,00.html. 
 7. Luke Harding, Putin Hits Back at UK by Expelling Diplomats, THE GUARDIAN, 
July 20, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2130814,00. 
html. 
 8. Andrew E. Kramer, Recalling Cold War, Russia Resumes Long-Range Sorties, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/18/world/ 
europe/18russia.html. 
 9. See U.S. Dep’t of St., Off. of the Press Sec’y, Announcement of Withdrawal from 
the ABM Treaty (Dec. 13, 2001), http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/2001/6848.htm [herein-
after ABM Withdrawal]. 
 10. See, e.g., Rein Müllerson, The ABM Treaty: Changed Circumstances, Extraordi-
nary Events, Supreme Interests and International Law, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 509 
(2001); Emily K. Penney, Comment, Is That Legal?: The United States’ Withdrawal from 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1287 (2001–02); Patricia Hewitson, 
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justification for withdrawal provided by President Bush, one commenta-
tor mused that “it is possible that the stated grounds of the U.S. with-
drawal [from the ABM Treaty] could be regarded as supplying a prece-
dent for withdrawal by the United States or other countries from other 
arms control treaties containing similar withdrawal clauses.”11 However, 
scant attention has been given to the legal implications of Russia’s “sus-
pension.”12 This is especially surprising given the fact that the CFE 
Treaty does not contain a “suspension” clause but only a “withdrawal” 
clause.13 Russia’s unilateral “suspension” of its obligations under the 
CFE Treaty, and the validity of Russia’s justifications are legal issues 
that may be analyzed under the law of treaties. 
Part I of this Note provides background on the adaptation of the CFE 
Treaty, a description of Russia’s “suspension” and a summary of the re-
actions of NATO members and other parties to the Treaty. Part II ana-
lyzes the differences between “withdrawal” and “suspension” in the law 
of treaties, and Part III closely examines the “Extraordinary Events” 
clause that appears in the CFE Treaty. Three customary international law 
grounds for treaty suspension are discussed in Part IV. Finally, Part V 
considers the legality of Russia’s unilateral “suspension” of its obliga-
tionns under the CFE Treaty, determining that the act constitutes a mate-
rial breach under customary international law. 
I. THE ADAPTED CFE TREATY, RUSSIA’S “SUSPENSION” AND 
REACTIONS   
Following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the enlargement of 
NATO,14 the States Parties to the CFE Treaty met in Istanbul and, on 
November 19, 1999, signed the Agreement on the Adaptation of the CFE 
Treaty (“CFE Adaptation Agreement”), replacing the anachronistic bloc-
based limits of the CFE Treaty with national and territorial ceilings,15 
                                                                                                             
Nonproliferation and Reduction of Nuclear Weapons: Risks of Weakening the Multilat-
eral Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 405 (2003). 
 11. Frederic L. Kirgis, Proposed Missile Defenses and the ABM Treaty, Second Ad-
dendum, ASIL INSIGHTS, Dec. 2001, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh70. 
htm#addendum (emphasis added). 
 12. But see Duncan B. Hollis, Russia Suspends CFE Treaty Participation, ASIL 
INSIGHTS, July 23, 2007, http://asil.org/insights/2007/07/insights070723.html. 
 13. See CFE Treaty, supra note 1, art. XIX(2). 
 14. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—all former Warsaw Pact members—
acceded to NATO on March 12, 1999. CNN.com, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic 
Joining NATO Today (Mar. 12, 1999), http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/12/ 
big.nato.01/index.html. 
 15. CFE Treaty Background, supra note 3. “National ceilings” refers to the maximum 
amount of defined armaments and equipment that a State Party is allowed to deploy any-
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and extending it to former Soviet republics.16 However, only four signa-
tories have since ratified the CFE Adaptation Agreement: Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.17 
At the time that the CFE Adaptation Agreement was signed in Istanbul 
in 1999, the Russian Federation specifically committed to withdrawing 
its military forces from the Republic of Moldova by the end of 2002, dis-
banding two of its military bases in Georgia by July 1, 2001, and negoti-
ating the duration of two other Russian bases in Georgia in the year 
2000.18 Russia has not completed the removal of its “peacekeepers” from 
the Moldovan break-away region of Transdniestria, nor from Russia’s 
military base at Gudauta, Georgia.19 NATO states have conditioned rati-
fication upon Russia’s promised but as-of-yet-incomplete withdrawal of 
ex-Soviet military bases from Georgia and Moldova.20 
                                                                                                             
where in the area of the CFE Treaty’s application; “territorial ceilings” means the total 
amount of equipment in each category limited by the CFE Treaty that is allowed on the 
territory of a State Party, including equipment owned by any other States Parties. Id. 
 16. Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe, Nov. 19, 1999, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/doclib/1999/11/ 
13760_en.pdf [hereinafter CFE Adaptation Agreement]. The following former Soviet 
republics signed the CFE Adaptation Agreement: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia. Id. at 1. The Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic (formally Czechoslovakia at the time the original CFE Treaty was signed) both 
signed the CFE Adaptation Agreement. Id. 
 17. Richard Weitz, Extraordinary Conference Fails to Achieve Agreement on CFE 
Treaty Dispute, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW, June 19, 2007, http://www.worldpolitics 
review.com/article.aspx?id=861. 
 18. Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe, 12–13, Nov. 19, 1999, available at http://www.osce.org/ 
documents/doclib/1999/11/13761_en.pdf. The agreements with Moldova and Georgia are 
commonly referred to as the “Istanbul commitments.” See CFE Treaty Background, su-
pra note 3 (referring to Moscow’s “obligations under the Adapted CFE Treaty and what 
have become known as the Istanbul commitments”). 
 19. See NATO, Questions and Answers on CFE, 2–3, 5, May 2007, available at 
http://www.nato.int/issues/arms_control/cfe_qa_factsheet.pdf. 
 20. See Richard Weitz, Georgia and the CFE Saga, CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS 
ANALYST, June 27, 2007, available at http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4643. There 
had been particular controversy over a lingering Russian military presence at Gudauta, 
Georgia, which the Russian Federation insists fulfills merely support functions for its 
“peacekeeping force in Abkhazia.” Id. However, a North Atlantic Council statement re-
leased ahead of the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008 suggested that NATO 
states had softened their stance. See Press Release, NATO, NAC Statement on CFE (Mar. 
28, 2008), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-047e.html [hereinafter 
March 2008 NAC Statement] (pledging to “move forward on ratification of the Adapted 
CFE Treaty in parallel with implementation of specific, agreed steps by the Russian Fed-
eration to resolve outstanding issues related to Russian forces/facilities in the Republic of 
Moldova and Georgia”) (emphasis added). Russia, however, seems not to have viewed 
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In his annual address to the Russian Parliament on April 26, 2007, 
President Putin warned of “a moratorium on [Russia’s] observance of 
[the CFE] treaty until such time as all NATO members without exception 
ratify it and start strictly observing its provisions, as Russia has been do-
ing so far on a unilateral basis.”21 Approximately one month later, the 
Russian Federation formally requested the Depository of the CFE Treaty 
(the Netherlands) to convene an “Extraordinary Conference of the States 
Parties.”22 Article XXI of the CFE Treaty provides that such a confer-
ence will be convened if a party “considers that exceptional circum-
stances relating to this Treaty have arisen[.]”23 In a press release, the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“Russian MFA”) pointed to “the 
serious problems that have arisen with the NATO nations’ implementa-
tion of the Treaty as a result of its enlargement and NATO foot-dragging 
on ratification of the [CFE Adaptation Agreement], signed in 1999.”24 A 
NATO document circulated in May 2007 asserted that “no provision in 
the Treaty . . . would allow for a unilateral moratorium on implementa-
tion of the Treaty” and that such a move “would constitute direct viola-
tion of the Treaty.”25 
The Extraordinary Conference, held in Vienna on June 12–15, 2007, 
failed to produce any agreement on ratification: NATO members stead-
fastly declined to ratify the CFE Adaptation Agreement until Russia 
completed the withdrawal of its military forces from Moldova and Geor-
gia (both of whom agreed with NATO), while Russia criticized the “arti-
ficial” linking of treaty ratification with Russia’s Istanbul commit-
                                                                                                             
this softening of rhetoric as a genuine concession, describing NATO’s continued refer-
ence to ‘Russian forces/facilities in the Republic of Moldova and Georgia’ as positions 
“that actually hinder exit from the current situation surrounding CFE” because Russia has 
already implemented its Istanbul commitments. See Press Release, Russian MFA Infor-
mation and Press Department Commentary on NATO’s Statement on Treaty on Conven-
tional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) (Apr. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/f68cd37b84711611c3256f6d00541094/7ab167be6f20e0c
dc325741f002dbe48?OpenDocument. 
 21. Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, Annual Address to the Fed-
eral Assembly (Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/ 
2007/04/26/1209_type70029type82912_125670.shtml. 
 22. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Convening 
an Extraordinary Conference to Discuss CFE Treaty (May 28, 2007), available at http:// 
www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/2e0b88fe13533efbc32572
ea00419155?OpenDocument [hereinafter Russian MFA Extraordinary Conference Re-
quest]. 
 23. CFE Treaty, supra note 1, art. XXI(2). 
 24. Russian MFA Extraordinary Conference Request, supra note 22. 
 25. Questions and Answers on CFE, supra note 19, at 3. 
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ments.26 The head of the Russian delegation, Anatoly Antonov, said after 
the conference that his government “would ‘carefully analyze and pon-
der’ the stalemate[,] . . . warn[ing], however, that Russia might have to 
suspend its implementation if the CFE remained unaltered for another 
year.”27 
Russia acted much more expeditiously. On July 14, 2007, President 
Putin issued an official decree declaring that “[e]xceptional circum-
stances surrounding the CFE Treaty have led the Russian Federation to 
consider suspending its participation in the Treaty until NATO members 
ratify the Adapted Treaty and begin to implement the document in good 
faith.”28 Putin’s announcement did not formally invoke article XIX (the 
“Extraordinary Events” clause) of the CFE Treaty, but he did offer the 
following six “exceptional circumstances that affect the security of the 
Russian Federation” in support of Russia’s decision to “suspend” the 
CFE Treaty: 
1. The failure of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic to make the necessary changes in the composition of 
group of states party to the Treaty on the accession of these countries to 
NATO; 
2. The excessive parties to the CFE Treaty that belong to NATO, and 
the exclusive group that formed among CFE Treaty members as a result 
of the widening of the alliance; 
3. The negative impact of the planned deployment of America’s con-
ventional forces in Bulgaria and Romania because of this exclusive 
group mentality; 
4. The failure of a number of parties of the CFE Treaty to comply with 
the political obligations contained in the Istanbul Agreements relating 
to the early ratification of the Adapted Treaty; 
                                                                                                             
 26. Weitz, supra note 17. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Suspension Announcement, supra note 4. The announcement stated that “[t]he 
operation of the [CFE] Treaty will be suspended in 150 days as of the date of Russia’s 
notifying the depositary and other member states of its decision.” Id. This notice period 
appears to derive from CFE Treaty article XIX(2), which requires that “[a] State Party 
intending to withdraw shall give notice of its decision to do so to the Depository and to 
all other States Parties [and that] [s]uch notice shall be given at least 150 days prior to the 
intended withdrawal from this Treaty.” CFE Treaty, supra note 1, art. XIX(2); see also 
Hollis, supra note 12 (pointing out that Russia’s “150 day notice period matches that 
required for withdrawal under CFE Article XIX(2)”). 
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5. The failure of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to 
comply with commitments accepted in Istanbul to adjust their territorial 
ceilings; 
6. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’s failure to participate in the CFE 
Treaty has adverse effects on Russia’s ability to implement its political 
commitments to military containment in the northwestern part of the 
Russian Federation. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’s actions result in a 
territory in which there are no restrictions on the deployment of con-
ventional forces, including other countries’ forces.29 
The statement indicated that the suspension is “in conformity with inter-
national law” and that “in case of necessity, immediate action to suspend 
the CFE Treaty can be taken by the President of the Russian Federa-
tion.”30 
The Russian MFA released a statement elaborating on President 
Putin’s decree.31 The MFA confirmed that it conveyed formal notifica-
tion of Russia’s suspension to the “depositaries [sic] and other states par-
ties to the CFE Treaty” on July 14, 2007.32 The statement also intimated 
the practical effects of the suspension on the Russian Federation’s obli-
gations under the CFE Treaty: 
                                                                                                             
 29. Suspension Announcement, supra note 4. The CFE Treaty provides that the re-
quired notice “shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the State Party re-
gards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” CFE Treaty, supra note 1, art. XIX(2). 
 30. Suspension Announcement, supra note 4. Article 37(4) of the 1995 Federal Law 
of the Russian Federation on International Treaties of the Russian Federation provides: 
The operation of an international treaty of the Russian Federation, the decision 
concerning consent to the bindingness of which for the Russian Federation was 
adopted in the form of a Federal Law, may be suspended by the President of the 
Russian Federation in instances requiring the taking of urgent measures, with 
the obligatory immediate informing of the Soviet of the Federation and the 
State Duma and the submission to the State Duma of a draft respective Federal 
Law.  
WILLIAM E. BUTLER, THE LAW OF TREATIES IN RUSSIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
INDEPENDENT STATES 190 (2002) (emphasis added). 
 31. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Statement 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (July 14, 2007) http://www. 
mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/95413db612370d01c325731a00
30e1b5?OpenDocument [hereinafter July MFA Statement]. The July MFA Statement is 
dated July 14, 2007, but is filed on the MFA Web site under July 16, 2007. See Docu-
ments and Materials of the Russian MFA, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/english? 
OpenView&Start=2.404 (last visited Apr. 25, 2008). 
 32. Id. The CFE Treaty designates “the Government of the Kingdom of Netherlands” 
as the Depository. CFE Treaty, supra note 1, art. XXII(1). 
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[I]n particular, providing information and receiving and conducting in-
spections will be temporarily suspended. Russia during the suspension 
will not be bound by any limits on conventional arms. But the real 
quantities of Russian military equipment will depend on the evolution 
of the military-political situation, particularly on the readiness of the 
other states parties to the CFE Treaty to show adequate restraint. . . . 
The Russian moratorium does not mean that we are shutting the door to 
further dialogue. In case of the solution of the questions raised by us it 
will be possible to quickly ensure the collective fulfillment of the 
Treaty’s provisions.33 
Notwithstanding the ostensibly equivocal language in Putin’s decree 
that Russia was “considering” a suspension, NATO responded as follows 
in a statement on July 16, 2007: 
The announcement by the Russian Federation issued on the 14th of 
July 2007 to suspend as of the 12th of December 2007 its participation 
in the work of this landmark Treaty, including its flank regime and as-
sociated documents is deeply disappointing. The Allies are very con-
cerned by this unilateral decision.34 
NATO Spokesman James Appathurai described Russia’s move as “a step 
in the wrong direction.”35 The U.S. Department of State echoed these 
sentiments.36 Even Ukraine, which has ratified the CFE Adaptation 
                                                                                                             
 33. July MFA Statement, supra note 31. Two months after the suspension announce-
ment, a Russian general informed the State Duma (the lower chamber of Russia’s Parlia-
ment) that “Russia will not scale up armaments for the duration of a moratorium” on the 
CFE Treaty. Russia Promises Not to Build Up Arms During CFE Moratorium, RIA 
NOVOSTI, Sept. 19, 2007, available at http://en.rian.ru/world/20070919/79524231. 
html. 
 34. Press Release, NATO, NATO Response to Russian Announcement of Intent to 
Suspend Obligations Under the CFE Treaty (July 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-085e.html. NATO’s indication that Russia’s “sus-
pension” would go into effect on December 12, 2007 (a date that did not appear in Presi-
dent Putin’s announcement) suggests that NATO regarded Putin’s announcement as the 
official beginning of the 150-day notice period required in article XIX(2) of the CFE 
Treaty. See Hollis, supra note 12, at n.7. 
 35. Slobodan Lekic, Suspension of CFE Treaty is a ‘Step in the Wrong Direction,’ 
NATO Says, July 16, 2007, THE INDEPENDENT, available at http://news.independent.co. 
uk/europe/article2773165.ece. 
 36. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Russian Announcement of Intention to 
Suspend Implementation of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (July 14, 
2007), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/88417.htm (“The United States 
is disappointed by the Russian announcement of its intention to suspend implementation 
of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.”). 
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Agreement, expressed alarm at Russia’s suspension.37 Although some 
have questioned the legal basis for Russia’s “suspension,”38 thus far no 
State Party to the CFE Treaty has challenged the legality of Russia’s 
move.39 
II. WITHDRAWAL VS. SUSPENSION     
Russia’s pronouncements have consistently warned of a “suspension” 
or a “moratorium,” but never of a “withdrawal.” However, the CFE 
Treaty provides only for the latter.40 These terms, and the mechanisms 
they represent, are not interchangeable.41 The Vienna Convention on the 
                                                                                                             
 37. Press Release, Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in Connec-
tion with Declaration of the Russian Federation of Implementation Suspension of the 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, July 19, 2007, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/publication/content/12547.htm [hereinafter Ukraine MFA 
Statement] (“Suspension of the CFE Treaty may be an impact for restoration of the at-
mosphere of distrust and have negative consequences for the European security sys-
tem.”). 
 38. See Hollis, supra note 12; Vladimir Socor, Russia Would Re-Write or Kill CFE 
Treaty, EURASIA DAILY MONITOR, July 18, 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article. 
php?article_id=2372298 (asserting that “Russia is placing itself in violation of the treaty 
in a legal sense and would be violating it in practical terms as well if it proceeds with the 
unilateral moratorium on compliance with the treaty’s terms”); see also Yuri Zak-
harovich, Why Putin Pulled Out of a Key Treaty, TIME.COM, July 14, 2007, http://www. 
time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1643566,00.html (“[A]s no provision for a unilateral 
moratorium was built into the CFE treaty, Russia’s action amounts to non-compliance, 
strictly speaking.”). 
 39. Neither NATO nor its member states have assailed the legality of Russia’s sus-
pension, despite NATO’s claim in a May 2007 report that “[s]uspension of implementa-
tion of [CFE] Treaty obligations would constitute a direct violation of the Treaty.” Ques-
tions and Answers on CFE, supra note 19, at 3. 
 40. See CFE Treaty, supra note 1, art. XIX(2). This provision reads: 
Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to 
withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the 
subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. A State 
Party intending to withdraw shall give notice of its decision to do so to the De-
pository and to all other States Parties. Such notice shall be given at least 150 
days prior to the intended withdrawal from this Treaty. It shall include a state-
ment of the extraordinary events the State Party regards as having jeopardized 
its supreme interests. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 41. See Hollis, supra note 12 (“[The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] care-
fully separates the rights of suspension and termination, without any indication of inter-
changeability or hierarchy.”). 
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Law of Treaties42 (“VCLT”), which “codified . . . the customary rules on 
the law of treaties,”43 provides for “[t]ermination of or withdrawal from a 
treaty” in article 54, a separate provision from the suspension provision 
found in article 57.44 VCLT article 70(2) provides that a withdrawal “re-
leases the [withdrawing party] from any obligation further to perform the 
treaty,” while article 72(1)(a) provides that a suspension “releases the 
[suspending party] from the obligation to perform the treaty . . . during 
the period of the suspension.”45 Presumably, “the treaty cannot bind the 
withdrawing state again unless it goes through a new procedure to ex-
press its consent to be bound,” whereas in a suspension “the treaty’s op-
eration can be resumed and the parties continue to have a treaty relation-
ship during the suspension period.”46 
Because withdrawal is a more drastic and permanent method of exiting 
a treaty than is suspension, one construction regards suspension as a 
“lesser, included power within the power to . . . withdraw from a 
treaty.”47 It would seem that “if the law of treaties seeks to preserve the 
stability of international commitments, it makes sense to always allow 
suspension in lieu of withdrawal or termination since the former will 
cause less injury to a treaty’s stability.”48 VCLT article 62(3) appears to 
support this view by providing that “[i]f . . . a party may invoke a funda-
mental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or with-
drawing from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for sus-
pending the operation of the treaty.”49 However, this is the only VCLT 
                                                                                                             
 42. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter VCLT]. The VCLT is widely considered to be the authoritative codification 
of the customary law of treaties, as well as a “progressive development” of it. See, e.g., 
IAN M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 26 (1973). The 
USSR, and by extension, the Russian Federation as the USSR’s state successor, acceded 
to the VCLT on April 29, 1986. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-
General, United Nations Treaty Collection: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapter 
XXIII/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXIII/treaty1.asp (last visited Apr. 25, 2008). 
 43. See J.F. O’CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (1991). 
 44. VCLT, supra note 42, arts. 54, 57; see also Hollis, supra note 12 (“[T]he fact that 
these rights come in two separate provisions militates against reading the powers as inter-
changeable; i.e., an express right to terminate only authorizes termination, not suspen-
sion.”). 
 45. VCLT, supra note 42, arts. 70(2), 72 (emphasis added). 
 46. Hollis, supra note 12 (emphasis added). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (citing PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES ¶ 237–38 (J. 
Mico and P. Haggenmacher trans., 1989)). 
 49. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 62(3) (emphasis added). The validity of Russia’s sus-
pension under VCLT article 62 will be considered infra text accompanying notes 188–91. 
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provision that seems to treat suspension as a derivative right of the right 
of withdrawal. This is likely because article 62 represents an “extremely 
narrow and restrictive” codification of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, 
now called “fundamental change of circumstances,” which has proved 
daunting for any state to invoke successfully.50 Thus, the VCLT’s gen-
eral approach is to regard suspension as a distinct right under the law of 
treaties.51 
International lawyers who negotiate treaties “use denunciation and 
withdrawal clauses to promote ratification and reduce uncertainty about 
the future.”52 Withdrawal clauses are attractive to states considering rati-
fication of a treaty because they allay a state’s fear that it will be indefi-
nitely bound by a treaty at the expense of its national interests.53 An em-
pirical survey of treaty exit provisions identified six common variations 
of denunciation and withdrawal clauses, but did not indicate that any exit 
clauses provided for suspension in lieu of or in addition to withdrawal.54 
These findings suggest that treaty drafters over the years have not viewed 
a right to suspension as having the same risk-management appeal as does 
the right to unilateral withdrawal; otherwise, “suspension” clauses would 
be included in a substantial number of treaties. Moreover, nearly all Cold 
War arms control treaties have included the “Extraordinary Events” 
clause that provides for withdrawal,55 but not for suspension. 
Especially where the suspending party does not place temporal limits 
on the suspension period, or establish firm conditions under which it will 
resume compliance with the treaty, suspension may damage a treaty’s 
stability at least as much as, if not more than, withdrawal. When a state 
party formally withdraws from a treaty, other states parties can continue 
to implement the treaty with the knowledge that they no longer owe legal 
                                                                                                             
 50. See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1643 (2005); see 
also Hollis, supra note 12. For additional discussion of VCLT article 62, see infra text 
accompanying notes 108–18. 
 51. Article 59 is illustrative of the VCLT’s distinct treatment of suspension. Para-
graph 1 of article 59 addresses termination of a treaty implied by conclusion of a later 
treaty, but paragraph 2 provides that “[t]he earlier treaty shall be considered as only sus-
pended in operation if it appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that such 
was the intention of the parties.” VCLT, supra note 42, art. 59. 
 52. Helfer, supra note 50, at 1647. 
 53. See id. at 1633. 
 54. See id. at 1597. 
 55. See Cindy A. Cohn, Note, Interpreting the Withdrawal Clause in Arms Control 
Treaties, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 849, 851 (1989). The language of the prototypical “Ex-
traordinary Events” clause is virtually identical to that in article XIX(2) of the CFE 
Treaty, which is reproduced supra note 40. 
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obligations under the treaty to the withdrawing state.56 However, when a 
state unilaterally suspends a treaty, it is unclear to other state parties 
whether the suspending party will ultimately resume implementation of 
the treaty or maintain its suspension indefinitely.57 Whereas the VCLT 
includes a separate article setting forth conditions under which a party 
can withdraw from a treaty that contains no provision for termination or 
withdrawal,58 the VCLT does not provide for unilateral suspension 
unless it conforms with the treaty’s provisions or is consented to by all 
the parties.59 Thus, the VCLT implicitly acknowledges that unilateral 
suspension is potentially more volatile than unilateral withdrawal. 
III. THE “EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS” CLAUSE 
Analytically distinct from the parsing of withdrawal and suspension 
rights under customary international law is the issue of justification: on 
what grounds may a state party withdraw from a treaty? Whereas most 
withdrawal clauses analyzed in three editions of a United Nations 
(“U.N.”) handbook “do not require a state to provide any justification for 
its decision to quit a treaty,” arms control treaties generally require a 
state to provide to the other states parties advance notice that includes an 
explanation of its reasons for withdrawal.60 Even if a treaty does not con-
tain a withdrawal clause, VCLT article 65 provides that “notification 
shall indicate the measure proposed to be taken [i.e., withdrawal or sus-
pension] and the reasons therefore.”61 
                                                                                                             
 56. See VCLT, supra note 42, art. 70. Withdrawal “releases the parties from any obli-
gation further to perform the treaty.” Id. art. 70(a). 
 57. Cf. Craig Dunkerley, Address at the Carnegie Moscow Center, The Politics of 
CFE—One American Perspective, (Nov. 16, 2007), at 18, available at 
http://www.carngie.ru/en/pubs/media/1074411%2016%2007%20Dunkerley%20CFE%20
Speaking%20Notes.pdf (“I am not predicting that any particular set of hard and fast 
events would inevitably follow from a mid-December Russian suspension of their CFE 
compliance but precisely the contrary: greater uncertainty.”). The VCLT seeks to miti-
gate the uncertainty surrounding the suspending party’s ultimate intentions by providing 
that “the parties shall refrain from acts tending to obstruct the resumption of the operation 
of the treaty” during the suspension period. See VCLT, supra note 42, art. 72(2). 
 58. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 56 (providing for denunciation or withdrawal if “it is 
established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or with-
drawal” or if “a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the 
treaty” so long as a party “give[s] not less than twelve months’ notice of its intention to 
denounce or withdraw”). 
 59. See id. art. 57. 
 60. Helfer, supra note 50, at 1598. 
 61. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 65(1). It has been suggested that VCLT article 65 is not 
addressed to states parties withdrawing from or suspending compliance with a treaty that 
expressly provides for withdrawal or suspension. See Antonio F. Perez, Survival of Rights 
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Since 1963, “all bilateral arms agreements between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union [footnote omitted] and almost all multilateral arms treaties” 
have included the “Extraordinary Events” clause.62 The Clause63 refers to 
the withdrawing state’s “national sovereignty” and “supreme interests,” 
but narrowly circumscribes the clause’s scope in that a state can only 
withdraw in response to “extraordinary events, related to the subject mat-
ter of this Treaty.”64 No tribunal has formally defined or interpreted this 
clause under international law.65 In fact, it has been fully exercised by a 
withdrawing state party on only two prior occasions: by North Korea 
when it announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (“NPT”) in 200366 and by the United States when it gave notice of 
its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2001.67 
The clause first appeared in article IV of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nu-
clear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Underwater68 
(also known as the “Partial Test Ban Treaty,” or “PTBT”). In negotiating 
the PTBT, the United States and the USSR contemplated three primary 
grounds justifying withdrawal under the “Extraordinary Events” clause: 
(1) breach of the treaty by a State Party, (2) nuclear tests by a state not 
party to the treaty that might jeopardize the national security of the with-
drawing party, and (3) nuclear explosions conducted by an unknown ac-
tor that would have violated the treaty or jeopardized the withdrawing 
party’s national security were the actor to be identified as either a State 
Party or a state not party to the treaty.69 Although the clause’s wording 
                                                                                                             
Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Withdrawal and the Continuing Right of 
International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, 34 VA. J. INT’L. L. 749, 779 n.89 (1994) 
(asserting that “[t]he domain of article 65 must . . . be those treaties which are silent on 
the subject” of treaty exit). 
 62. Cohn, supra note 55, at 851. 
 63. The text of the “Extraordinary Events” clause in the CFE Treaty is reproduced 
supra note 40. 
 64. See Cohn, supra note 55, at 854. 
 65. See Penney, supra note 10, at 1301 (citing Cohn, supra note 55, at 855). 
 66. See Statement of DPRK Government on its Withdrawal from NPT, Korean Central 
News Agency of DPRK, Jan. 10, 2003, available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/ 
2003/200301/news01/11.htm [hereinafter DPRK Statement]. 
 67. See Kirgis, supra note 11. 
 68. Cohn, supra note 55, at 851. 
 69. 2 MOHAMED I. SHAKER, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 1959–1979, at 887–88 (1980). To the extent that analyses of the with-
drawal clause in the NPT include a discussion of the negotiating history of the original 
“Extraordinary Events” clause in the PTBT, such background information is helpful in 
interpreting the scope of the same clause in the CFE Treaty. Cf. id. at 885 (“Since [the 
withdrawal] right has been previously affirmed in the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, it would be 
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seemed to leave “judgements on the existence of the extraordinary events 
completely to the discretion of the withdrawing state,”70 in testimony 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1963, then U.S. Secre-
tary of State Dean Rusk expressed his view that “a country could not 
withdraw for simply frivolous or unrelated matters as a matter of whim 
and still pretend that it is legal within the treaty to do so.”71 Although 
Rusk’s statement suggests that certain reasons for withdrawal are not 
covered under the “Extraordinary Events” clause, neither the PTBT nor 
the CFE Treaty includes a provision for resolving a dispute between 
States Parties about the validity of a withdrawal under the clause.72 
The paragraph that follows the withdrawal clause in the CFE Treaty 
spells out one circumstance where the right to withdraw is guaranteed: if 
a State Party attempts to circumvent the treaty by amassing conventional 
weapons holdings beyond the treaty’s scope, thereby threatening the bal-
ance of forces.73 A U.S. Department of Defense analysis explains that 
                                                                                                             
quite relevant here [with regard to the NPT] to trace back its origins in the negotiating 
history of the latter.”) 
 70. JENNY NIELSEN & JOHN SIMPSON, MOUNTBATTEN CTR. FOR INT’L STUD., THE NPT 
WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE AND ITS NEGOTIATING HISTORY 4 (2004), http://www.mcis.soton.ac 
.uk/Site_Files/pdf/withdrawal_clause_NPT_nielsen&simpson_2004.pdf. 
 71. Cohn, supra note 55, at 851–52 (quoting Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests 
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
Foreign Relations, 88th Cong. 50 (1963) (statement of Dean Rusk, U.S. Sec’y of State)). 
 72. A provision of the CFE Treaty does require the Depository to “convene a confer-
ence of the States Parties which shall open no later than 21 days after receipt of the notice 
of withdrawal in order to consider questions relating to the withdrawal from this Treaty.” 
CFE Treaty, supra note 1, art. XXI(4). However, such a conference cannot be regarded as 
an adjudicative mechanism; it is simply an opportunity for multilateral negotiations. 
Somewhat in contrast is the withdrawal clause in the NPT Treaty, which, while otherwise 
identical to that in the CFE Treaty (except for a three months’ notice period instead of 
150 days), requires that the withdrawing party also provide notice to the United Nations 
(“U.N.”) Security Council. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. 
X(1), opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 493, 721 U.N.T.S. 161, 175 (en-
tered into force Mar. 5, 1970) [hereinafter NPT Treaty]. 
If the [Security] Council then found that the withdrawal might foreshadow [a 
‘threat to the peace’ under UN Charter Articles 24, 39 and 41–42], it would 
have authority to take action to delay or prevent withdrawal, or to require other 
action by the withdrawing party to keep the peace before it would have permis-
sion to withdraw.  
George Bunn & Roland Timerbaev, The Right to Withdraw from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT): The Views of Two NPT Negotiators, 10 YADERNY KONTROL 
[NUCLEAR CONTROL] DIGEST 20, 25 (2005), available at http://iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/ 
21011/Bunn_Timerbaev.pdf. 
 73. CFE Treaty, supra note 1, art. XIX(3). The paragraph provides:  
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this provision was included to deter the Soviet Union from stockpiling 
armaments and equipment just east of the Ural Mountains, which would 
be outside the CFE Treaty’s area of application, and from building up 
conventional armaments not limited by the treaty, such as armored com-
bat vehicles controlled by paramilitary groups.74 This provision demon-
strates that the phrase “subject matter of this Treaty” in article XIX(2)75 
is a relatively flexible concept that provides the right to withdraw even in 
the absence of a party’s breach of its explicit treaty obligations. 
The question of the scope of the CFE Treaty’s withdrawal clause was 
broached several times during U.S. Senate ratification hearings in 1991. 
In response to a question by Senator Biden about whether the United 
States would withdraw in the event that the USSR breached a “political 
pledge” to neutralize equipment east of the Urals, then Secretary of State 
James Baker III replied that “we have withdrawal rights that are perhaps 
a bit broader than just for reasons of circumvention of the treaty” and 
affirmed that “[w]e would have the right [to withdraw] under our na-
tional security withdrawal rights.”76 In a written response to a similar line 
of questioning by Senator Lugar, Secretary Baker stated that “violation 
of the statement alone would give rise to a compliance issue in the Joint 
Consultative Group and it could, depending in [sic] its seriousness, create 
a right of withdrawal from the treaty under article XIX.”77 Another area 
                                                                                                             
Each State Party shall, in particular, in exercising its national sovereignty, have 
the right to withdraw from this Treaty if another State Party increases its hold-
ings in battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or at-
tack helicopters, as defined in Article II, which are outside the scope of the 
limitations of this Treaty, in such proportions as to pose an obvious threat to the 
balance of forces within the area of application. 
Id. 
 74. U.S. Dep’t of Defense., Off. of the Under Sec’y for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, Treaty Compliance, CFE Treaty: Article-by-Article Analysis—Article XIX, 
http://www.dod.mil/acq/acic/treaties/cfe/artbyart/analysis19.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 
2008) [hereinafter DOD Analysis]. 
 75. CFE Treaty, supra note 1, art. XIX(2). 
 76. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on European Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102nd Cong. 887 (1991) 
(statement of James Baker III, U.S. Sec’y of State), available at 
http://www.dod.mil/acq/acic/treaties/cfe/congress/rattest2.htm [hereinafter Baker Testi-
mony]. 
 77. Id. The Joint Consultative Group, established in article XVI of the CFE Treaty 
and governed by procedures set forth in the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, is 
charged with, inter alia, “address[ing] questions relating to compliance with or possible 
circumvention of the provisions of this Treaty” and “consider[ing] matters of dispute 
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of inquiry concerned the U.S. right to withdraw if Russia, Ukraine or 
Belarus gained independence and refused to join the CFE Treaty. Secre-
tary Baker’s written statement indicated that withdrawal would be a pre-
rogative in this eventuality.78 These flexible interpretations of the “Ex-
traordinary Events” clause should be contextualized in a ratification 
process wherein the State Department endeavors to assuage Senators’ 
concerns about U.S. obligations under the Treaty. Nevertheless, they re-
flect one State Party’s understanding that withdrawal under article 
XIX(2) could be a legally sound response in various circumstances sur-
rounding the CFE Treaty. 
Thirty years after the original “Extraordinary Events” clause was born, 
a state invoked it for the first time. On March 12, 1993, the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK”) notified the U.N. Security Coun-
cil of its intent to withdraw from the NPT79 under article X(1), effective 
three months later.80 This notice included two reasons for the DPRK’s 
decision: (1) a 1993 joint military exercise between South Korea and the 
United States that the DPRK claimed threatened its security, and (2) the 
International Atomic Energy Association (“IAEA”) inspectors’ alleged 
lack of objectivity in carrying out a specially authorized inspection of 
sites in the vicinity of DPRK nuclear energy facilities.81 
In the following months, the NPT’s depositaries—the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation—as well as the U.N. 
Security Council, prevailed upon the DPRK to reverse its planned with-
drawal.82 A joint statement by the depositaries “question[ed] whether the 
DPRK’s stated reasons for withdrawing constitute[d] extraordinary 
                                                                                                             
arising out of the implementation of this Treaty.” CFE Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 
XVI(2)(A), XVI (2)(I), (7). 
 78. Baker Testimony, supra note 76 (“The Treaty contains mechanisms for with-
drawal should this be necessary.”). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in collabo-
ration with the Bush Sr. administration, developed a protocol for reacting to non-
accession by militarily significant former Soviet republics; it gave the President the 
power to recommend withdrawal from the Treaty to the Senate following an unsuccessful 
“extraordinary conference” convenyed under article XXI. See CONG. REC. S18001, 
S18025 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Biden), available at 
http://www.dod.mil/acq/acic/treaties/cfe/congress/rattest15.htm. 
 79. NPT Treaty, supra note 72, art. X(1). 
 80. Perez, supra note 61, at 750. The NPT’s requirement that a party withdrawing 
under the “Extraordinary Events” clause give notice of its intention to withdraw to the 
U.N. Security Council creates potential for third-party review of a withdrawal’s validity. 
See Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 72, at 22, 25. 
 81. Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 72, at 20–21. 
 82. Perez, supra note 61, at 751. 
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events relating to the subject-matter of the Treaty.”83 On June 11, 1993 
just one day before its withdrawal was to become effective, the DPRK 
announced that it was “suspending” its withdrawal and “accept[ed] safe-
guards on all its nuclear material.”84 
For nearly the next ten years, the DPRK remained a party to the NPT, 
until January 10, 2003, when it declared “an automatic and immediate 
effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT, on which ‘it unilaterally 
announced a moratorium as long as it deemed necessary’ according to 
the June 11, 1993, DPRK-U.S. joint statement.” 85 The DPRK’s position 
was that it was reinstating its 1993 notice of withdrawal, under which 
remained  all but one day before it was to become legally binding.86 The 
States Parties to the NPT rejected this argument, regarding the DPRK’s 
declaration as a new notice of a withdrawal that would not become effec-
tive until April 10, 2003.87 Neither the NPT nor the VCLT makes provi-
sion for the “suspension” of a notice of withdrawal.88 The VCLT pro-
vides only that “[a] notification or instrument [of withdrawal] may be 
revoked at any time before it takes effect.”89 The NPT parties’ apparent 
interpretation of the DPRK’s 1993 “moratorium” on its withdrawal as a 
full “revocation” under VCLT article 68 suggests that customary interna-
tional law does not permit states to implement “suspension” where the 
VCLT provides only for a more stable measure like “revocation.”90 
                                                                                                             
 83. NPT Co-Depositories Statement, reprinted in letter Dated 1 April 1993 from the 
Representatives of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/25515 (Apr. 2, 1993) 
[hereinafter NPT Co-Depositories Statement]. The statement of the depositories also 
noted that “nuclear-related security assurances have been provided to the DPRK as a non-
nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.” Id. This fact ostensibly served to undermine the 
DPRK’s claims about any “extraordinary events” threatening its security. See Perez, su-
pra note 61, at 774 (“[The relevant context for interpreting [NPT] article X(1) arguably 
includes the assurances given by the [Nuclear Weapon State parties] as an inducement for 
[Non Nuclear Weapon State] parties to adhere to the NPT[.]”). 
 84. Perez, supra note 61, at 751. 
 85. DPRK Statement, supra note 66. 
 86. See Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 72, at 21. 
 87. See Jean du Preez & William Potter, James Martin Ctr. for Nonproliferation Stud., 
North Korea’s Withdrawal from the NPT: A Reality Check (Apr. 9, 2003), 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030409.htm (“[T]he generally held view is that North Ko-
rea’s withdrawal [came] into effect on 10 April 2003 when its three-month notice of 
withdrawal expire[d].”). 
 88. See Perez, supra note 61, at 751 n.9. 
 89. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 68 (emphasis added). 
 90. The official commentary to the International Law Commission’s 1966 Draft Arti-
cles on the Law of Treaties, upon which the VCLT is based, affirmed the importance of a 
right of revocation during the notice period without mentioning the “suspension” of a 
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Moreover, although the DPRK claimed to act “under the grave situation 
where [its] supreme interests are most seriously threatened,”91 its 
grounds for withdrawal in 2003 were no more valid under the “Extraor-
dinary Events” clause than they were in 1993.92 However, the U.N. Secu-
rity Council did not invalidate the DPRK’s reasons for withdrawal and 
order the DPRK to remain within the NPT because China would have 
vetoed such a resolution.93 
Perhaps the United States did not challenge the legality of the DPRK’s 
2003 withdrawal from the NPT because the United States had, about one 
year earlier, itself unilaterally withdrawn from a landmark arms control 
treaty.94 On December 13, 2001, the United States conveyed notice of its 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine.95 The U.S. statement expressly invoked article XV(2) of the 
ABM Treaty, which is substantively identical to the CFE Treaty’s with-
drawal clause.96 After noting that the “strategic relationship with Russia . 
. . is cooperative rather than adversarial,” unlike when the Treaty was 
concluded in 1972, the United States described the development of long-
                                                                                                             
withdrawal notice. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Reports of the International Law Commission 
to the General Assembly, at 38, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 169, 264 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/191 [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on 
the Law of Treaties with commentaries] (“[T]he considerations militating in favour of 
encouraging the revocation of notices and instruments of denunciations, terminations, etc. 
are so strong that the general rule should admit a general freedom to do so prior to the 
taking effect of the notice or instrument.”). 
 91. DPRK Statement, supra note 66. 
 92. See Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 72, at 22–23 (contending that the 2003 with-
drawal notice must have relied upon the two reasons provided by the DPRK in its aborted 
1993 withdrawal, both of which were inadequate because they did not “relate to the ‘sub-
ject matter’ of the NPT”). 
 93. See id. at 24. The Security Council only “call[ed] upon North Korea to permit 
IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections.” Id. at 23. 
 94. See ABM Withdrawal, supra note 9 (indicating that the U.S. withdrawal would go 
into effect “six months from [December 13, 2001]”—on June 13, 2002). 
 95. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of St., Text of Diplomatic Notes Sent to Russia, Bela-
rus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine (Dec. 14, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ 
ps/2001/6859.htm [hereinafter ABM Withdrawal Diplomatic Notice]. Pursuant to a 1997 
Memorandum of Understanding, these four post-Soviet states were deemed the official 
“successor states” to the USSR, as regards the ABM Treaty. See generally Linda 
McCarty, Note, Succession of the ABM Treaty, 9 NEW. ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 603 
(2003). 
 96. See ABM Withdrawal Diplomatic Notice, supra note 95. The only differences 
between the withdrawal clauses in the ABM and CFE Treaties is that the former requires 
a six-month notice period and does not require notice to any “depository.” See Treaty on 
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. XV, May 26, 1972, 
23 U.S.T. 3434. 
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range ballistic missiles by certain states and the active attempt to acquire 
“weapons of mass destruction” by “a number of state and non-state enti-
ties” as “pos[ing] a direct threat to the territory and security of the United 
States and jeopardiz[ing] its supreme interests.”97 President Putin, in a 
televised response, declared that the U.S. decision was “mistaken” but 
that it did “not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Fed-
eration.”98 However, many other world leaders and U.S. senators ex-
pressed concern that the U.S. repudiation of the ABM Treaty could spur 
a new arms race in anti-ballistic missiles.99 
Most legal analyses leading up to and in the wake of the U.S. with-
drawal concluded that growing threats from “rogue states” and terrorists, 
especially after the attacks of September 11, 2001, constituted “extraor-
dinary events” justifying unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty.100 At the 
same time, commentators warned that negotiation and compromise with 
Russia to modify the ABM Treaty would have been a sounder policy for 
the U.S, given third-party states’ dependence on the security environ-
ment established by the Treaty.101 More controversial was whether the 
U.S. withdrawal comported with the “fundamental change of circum-
stances” doctrine in VCLT article 62, which the White House seemed 
implicitly to invoke in its withdrawal statement.102 Some suggested that 
                                                                                                             
 97. ABM Withdrawal Diplomatic Notice, supra note 95. 
 98. U.S. Withdrawal from ABM Treaty: International Comment and Reaction, 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0112/doc01.htm#int (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). 
 99. See id. (citing U.N. Secretary-General Annan’s concern that “the annulation of the 
[ABM Treaty] may provoke an arms race, especially in the missile area, and further un-
dermine disarmament and non-proliferation regimes”). U.S. Senate Majority Leader Tho-
mas Daschle said that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty “presents some very serious 
questions with regard to future arms races involving other countries, and sends the wrong 
message to the world with regard to [the United States’] intent in abiding with treaties.” 
Id.  
 100. See, e.g., Müllerson, supra note 10, at 531–35; Penney, supra note 10, at 1317 
(“[T]he Bush administration could frame a valid, good faith argument for withdrawal on 
national security interests.”). 
 101. See Müllerson, supra note 10, at 536 (“The unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. from 
the ABM Treaty without seeking arrangements with Russia may undermine other arms-
control agreements.”). 
 102. Compare id. at 539 (contending that “current changes are of such a magnitude and 
character that if rebus sic stantibus can ever be justifiably used this may be one of such 
cases”), and Frederic L. Kirgis, Proposed Missile Defenses and the ABM Treaty, ASIL 
INSIGHTS, May 2001, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh70.htm  (stating that 
“President Bush thus appears to have set the stage for a change-of-circumstances argu-
ment”), with MALGOSIA FITZMAURICE & OLUFEMI ELIAS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE 
LAW OF TREATIES 195 (2005) (concluding that “there would seem to be sufficient reason 
to question the applicability of the doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances in 
the context of the termination of the ABM Treaty”). 
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the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty set a precedent for future 
withdrawal from arms control treaties.103 However, the consensus was 
that the implications of the U.S. withdrawal, and any resolution to a 
treaty dispute with Russia, would likely be political rather than legal.104 
IV. POSSIBLE GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION UNDER CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A U.S. Department of Defense analysis of the CFE Treaty states that 
the “right of withdrawal [under article XIX(2)] is in addition to any other 
rights a State Party has under customary international law regarding ter-
mination or suspension of the Treaty . . . .”105 Such additional rights un-
der customary law are to be found exclusively in the provisions of the 
VCLT.106 The three relevant VCLT provisions for unilateral treaty exit 
are article 62 (Fundamental Change of Circumstances), article 60 
(Breach), and article 61 (Impossibility).107 
The centuries-old customary doctrine of rebus sic stantibus was codi-
fied, amidst much debate, in what eventually became VCLT article 62.108 
At the 1968 Diplomatic Conference on the Law of Treaties there was, 
however, agreement “that it was essential to make this doctrine as restric-
tive as possible to safeguard against abuse and to emphasize that its ap-
plication in practice should be exceptional, and that the stability of trea-
ties should be maintained.”109 Thus, paragraph 1 of article 62 in effect 
requires satisfaction of five conditions: (1) there must be a change of cir-
                                                                                                             
 103. See, e.g., Kirgis, supra note 11 (noting that “it is possible that the stated grounds 
of the U.S. withdrawal could be regarded as supplying a precedent for withdrawal by the 
United States or other countries from other arms control treaties containing similar with-
drawal clauses”); Hewitson, supra note 10, at 434 (discussing “the precedential value of 
the U.S. ABM Treaty withdrawal” for the DPRK’s subsequent withdrawal from the 
NPT). 
 104. See David Sloss, Proposed Missile Defenses and the ABM Treaty, Reply to Re-
sponse, ASIL INSIGHTS, Aug. 2001, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh70.htm#reply 
(“[T]he issue must be resolved politically, not legally.”). 
 105. DOD Analysis, supra note 74. 
 106. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 42(2) (providing that termination, denunciation, with-
drawal,or suspension of a treaty’s operation “may take place only as a result of the appli-
cation of the provisions of the treaty or of the present Convention”). 
 107. See Hollis, supra note 12. VCLT article 56 also provides for unilateral denuncia-
tion or withdrawal from a treaty, but can only be invoked by a party seeking to leave a 
treaty that “does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal.” VCLT, supra note 42, art. 
56. Insofar as the CFE Treaty includes a withdrawal clause, VCLT article 56 is inappli-
cable. CFE Treaty, supra note 1, art. XIX(2). 
 108. See generally ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries, supra 
note 90, at 257–60. 
 109. FITZMAURICE & ELIAS, supra note 102, at 176. 
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cumstances existing when the treaty was concluded, (2) the change must 
be “fundamental,” (3) the parties must not have foreseen the change, (4) 
the existence of those circumstances must have been an essential basis 
for the parties’ original consent to be bound by the treaty, and (5) the 
change must radically transform the “extent” of treaty obligations still to 
be performed.110    
Article 62 of the VCLT does not define the terms “fundamental” or 
“extent of obligations still to be performed,”111 nor, for that matter, de-
lineate the scope of the term “circumstances.” Paragraph 2 expressly dis-
qualifies invocation of the doctrine in two cases: if the treaty in question 
establishes a boundary, or if the invoking party’s own breach of any in-
ternational obligation owed to a party to the treaty is the cause of the 
claimed “fundamental change.”112 Finally, as discussed supra above in 
Part II, paragraph 3 of article 62 provides that a party invoking article 62 
to suspend a treaty’s operation must satisfy the same conditions required 
for termination or withdrawal—the five-part test of paragraph 1.113 
Traditionally, the outbreak of war between parties to a treaty or the 
creation of new states have both been accepted as grounds for application 
of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine, whereas internal political revolutions, 
policy shifts, or the partial loss of treaty goals have been rejected.114 In 
the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case before the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”), Hungary claimed that its 1992 termination of a 1977 treaty with 
then Czechoslovakia was justified under VCLT article 62 because the 
policy of “socialist integration” had disappeared, market economies had 
emerged in both states, a “unilateral scheme” had replaced a “single and 
indivisible operational system,” and the treaty had become “a prescrip-
tion for environmental disaster.”115 The 1997 judgment of the ICJ deter-
mined that the collective effect of these changed circumstances would 
not “radically transform the extent of the obligations still to be per-
formed.”116 The court thus confirmed the exacting customary law stan-
dard required for invocation of article 62.117 Moreover, since the “Ex-
                                                                                                             
 110. Id. at 177. 
 111. Kirgis, supra note 102. Thus, “[l]acking any common criteria of what is funda-
mental, decision makers attach significance to certain changes through the screen of their 
own pursued and perceived values.” ARI DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY 
TERMINATION: LAWFUL BREACHES AND RETALIATIONS 49 (1975). 
 112. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 62(2). 
 113. See id. art. 62(3). The five-part test is discussed supra note 110 and accompany-
ing text. 
 114. See Cohn, supra note 55, at 858–63. 
 115. Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 57 (Sept. 25). 
 116. Id. at 61. 
 117. See FITZMAURICE & ELIAS, supra note 102, at 361–62. 
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traordinary Events” clause is available to states parties to arms control 
treaties, the “fundamental change of circumstances” doctrine “at best . . . 
would operate as a secondary argument which has no immediate legal 
effect.”118 
VCLT article 60 permits a party to suspend unilaterally a multilateral 
treaty as a response to a specific event: material breach of that treaty by 
one of the parties.119 If a party is “specially affected by the breach,” then 
it can “suspend[] the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the re-
lations between itself and the defaulting State.”120 Alternately, in a treaty 
“of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one party 
radically changes the position of every party,” any party (besides the de-
faulting state) can suspend the treaty in whole or in part.121 This latter 
provision was designed for disarmament or arms control treaties.122 Para-
graph 3 defines “material” breaches as either “a repudiation of the treaty 
not sanctioned by the present Convention” or “the violation of a provi-
sion essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the 
treaty.”123 
The ICJ also had occasion to interpret article 60 in the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros case, insofar as Hungary claimed that Czechoslovakia mate-
rially breached a treaty in 1991 by launching a project known as “Variant 
C” to divert the Danube River.124 The court, in rejecting Hungary’s con-
tention, stressed the importance of procedural rules, and applied article 
60 “in a very rigorous manner.”125 Moreover, “if [a] breach is not mate-
rial . . . any purported denunciation on the grounds of breach will be ille-
gal and invalid . . . becom[ing] a breach in itself giving the other party a 
right to take countermeasures.”126 
VCLT article 61 provides that an “impossibility of performing a 
treaty” may be invoked “as a ground for suspending the operation of the 
treaty” where the “impossibility results from the . . . [temporary] disap-
pearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of 
                                                                                                             
 118. Id. at 193. But see Cohn, supra note 55, at 870 (applying the “Fundamental 
Change of Circumstances” analysis as an “analogy” to assess whether the United States 
could withdraw from the ABM Treaty in 1989 under the Treaty’s “Extraordinary Events” 
clause). 
 119. See VCLT, supra note 42, art. 60. 
 120. Id. art. 60(2)(b). 
 121. Id. art. 60(2)(c). 
 122. See MOHAMMED M. GOMAA, SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF TREATIES ON 
GROUNDS OF BREACH 104 (1996). 
 123. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 60(3). 
 124. Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 63 (Sept. 25). 
 125. FITZMAURICE & ELIAS, supra note 102, at 365. 
 126. GOMAA, supra note 122, at 135–36. 
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the treaty.”127 Paragraph 2 precludes the invocation of impossibility “if 
the impossibility is the result of a breach by that party either of an obliga-
tion under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any 
other party to the treaty.”128 In Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, the ICJ suggested 
a narrow interpretation of impossibility of performance based on the dis-
cussions at the 1968 Diplomatic Conference that adopted the VCLT.129 
While the court found it unnecessary “to determine whether the term ‘ob-
ject’ in Article 61 can also be understood to embrace a legal régime”—as 
Hungary had argued it should—the court dutifully applied paragraph 2, 
finding that Hungary’s own breaches of the treaty brought about any 
“impossibility.”130 
V. ASSESSING THE (IL)LEGALITY OF RUSSIA’S “SUSPENSION” 
Russia’s unilateral “suspension” of the CFE Treaty has drawn a swarm 
of political and media attention,131 but not much reaction from scholars 
of international law.132 There may be a presumption that Russia’s move, 
following the treaty withdrawals of the DPRK and the United States ear-
lier this decade, is legally unassailable because of the “Extraordinary 
Events” clause.133 This view is misguided. Russia’s suspension has un-
covered a novel question in the law of treaties, an exploration of which 
may not only facilitate resolution of the ongoing impasse over the CFE 
Treaty, but also help enhance the stability of arms control agreements in 
general. 
Russia’s suspension of the CFE Treaty’s operation, in effect as of De-
cember 12, 2007,134 amounts to breach of the treaty, embodying both 
                                                                                                             
 127. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 61(1). This article first provides for termination or 
withdrawal based on “permanent” impossibility before stipulating that “[i]f the impossi-
bility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of 
the treaty.” Id. 
 128. Id. art. 61(2). 
 129. Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 60. 
 130. Id. at 60–61. 
 131. See, e.g., Federico Bordonaro, The Implications of Russia’s Moratorium of the 
C.F.E. Treaty, POWER AND INTEREST NEWS REP., Nov. 14, 2007, http://www.pinr.com/ 
report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=721&language_id=1; Richard Weitz, Russia’s 
CFE Suspension Threatens European Arms Control, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW, Dec. 19, 
2007, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1448. 
 132. But see Hollis, supra note 12. Professor Hollis’s timely article is, to the Author’s 
knowledge at the time of this Note’s publication, the only serious legal analysis of Rus-
sia’s “suspension” of the CFE Treaty besides this Note. 
 133. See Sloss, supra note 104 (“[T]he question whether a country’s ‘supreme inter-
ests’ have been jeopardized . . . is not a justiciable question.”). 
 134. December Russian MFA Statement, supra note 5. 
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forms of material breach delineated in VCLT article 60(3). First, the sus-
pension is a material breach as “a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned 
by [the VCLT].”135 The VCLT allows for suspension that is either “in 
conformity with the provisions of the treaty” or has the “consent of all 
the parties after consultation with the other contracting States.”136 
Clearly, the parties to the CFE Treaty did not consent to the suspension: 
a NATO statement dated December 12, 2007 declared that “NATO Al-
lies deeply regret” Russia’s decision.137 Russia’s intended suspension 
was not a topic at the “Extraordinary Conference” in June 2007,138 so 
there was effectively no formal “consultation with the other contracting 
states.” 
Nor does Russia’s “suspension” conform to the provisions of the CFE 
Treaty. The Treaty, which is of “unlimited duration,” provides in article 
XIX(2) that “[e]ach State Party shall . . . have the right to withdraw from 
this Treaty . . . .”139 Russian authorities have expressly distinguished 
Russia’s “suspension” from a withdrawal,140 so there is no translation 
discrepancy. VCLT article 31(1) prescribes the general rule that “[a] 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light 
of its object and purpose.”141 The ordinary meaning of the term “with-
draw” may be ascertained from VCLT article 70, which provides that 
withdrawal “releases the [withdrawing party] from any obligation further 
                                                                                                             
 135. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 60(3)(a). 
 136. Id. art. 57. 
 137. Press Release, NATO, Alliance’s Statement on the Russian Federation’s “Suspen-
sion” of its CFE Obligations (Dec. 12, 2007), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/ 
2007/p07-139e.html. NATO states reiterated their lack of consent to Russia’s “suspen-
sion” in a March 2008 statement. See March 2008 NAC Statement, supra note 20 (“Rus-
sia’s ‘suspension’ risks eroding the integrity of the CFE regime and undermines the co-
operative approach to security which has been a core of the NATO-Russia relationship 
and European security for nearly two decades.”). 
 138. Russia Will Not Talk CFE Treaty Withdrawal in Vienna, RIA NOVOSTI, June 6, 
2007, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070606/66759638.html. The “emergency CFE confer-
ence” to which this article refers is the “Extraordinary Conference” discussed above. See 
supra text accompanying notes 23–27. 
 139. CFE Treaty, supra note 1, art. XIX(1), (2) (emphasis added). 
 140. See, e.g., Russia’s Upper House Backs Suspension of CFE Treaty, RADIO FREE 
EUROPE, Nov. 16, 2007,  http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/11/E9FBE1AC-6A86-
4DE1-8BE8-54DC8FBB10E8.html (“[Russian Foreign Minister Sergei] Lavrov also 
made clear that the move should be considered a suspension, and not what he called the 
‘extreme measure’ of withdrawal.”). 
 141. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 31(1) (emphasis added). 
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to perform the treaty.”142 Thus, under an ordinary meaning interpretation 
of article XIX(2), Russia’s suspension is a clear violation.143 
Yet Russia’s Foreign Minister has publicly placed Russia on the fol-
lowing legal footing: 
From the legal point of view, the withdrawal provision in the CFE 
Treaty gives reason to assert that a member state has the right to sus-
pend the Treaty on the same grounds on which it can withdraw from it. 
This conclusion arises from the general principle of law and the usual 
norm of international law, expressed by the formula ‘he who has 
greater leeway is also entitled to the smaller leeway contained in it.’ In 
the light of this legal principle repeatedly applied in international legal 
practice, withdrawal from the treaty is ‘greater leeway,’ and suspension 
‘the smaller leeway’ therein contained.144 
Here, then, lies the legal foundation of Russia’s “suspension”: a pur-
ported “general principle of law” used as a maxim of interpretation. The 
principle cited by Minister Lavrov, using his language, is not encoun-
tered in any authorities.145 The closest Latin phrase is major continet in 
se minus (“the greater includes within itself the less.”).146 However, nei-
ther this maxim, nor any application of it, is encountered in any interna-
tional law materials. Even the English lay phrase “lesser, included 
power,” 147 which adequately captures the concept upon which Russia 
relies, is not found in any relevant authorities. Russia’s suggestion that 
the principle is frequently used in international law is thus unsupported. 
In distinction is a competing Latin phrase: expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius (“to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of . . . the 
                                                                                                             
 142. Id. art. 70(1)(a), 70(2). 
 143. The VCLT provides that “[a] special meaning shall be given to a term if it is es-
tablished that the parties so intended.” Id. art. 31(4). This cannot be established for rea-
sons discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 148–58. 
 144. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Replies by Russian Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov to Questions from the German Newspaper Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, Dec. 3, 2007, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7 
b43256999005bcbb3/7e227d8f37ec91b8c32573a70036fb3a?OpenDocument. 
 145. Extensive text searches of Minister Lavrov’s term were performed in the Westlaw 
and Lexis-Nexis legal databases, as well in Google. 
 146. BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 297 (1916); cf. STEWART RAPALJE & ROBERT L. 
LAWRENCE, A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW 899 (1997) (Omne majus 
continet in se minus, minus in se complectitur: “the greater contains or embraces the 
less.”). 
 147. See Hollis, supra note 12 (“[I]n order for Russia to sustain its reliance on the CFE 
Treaty, the law of treaties would need either to regard suspension and withdrawal as in-
terchangeable, or view the suspension power as a lesser, included power within the power 
to terminate or withdraw from a treaty.”). 
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alternative.”).148 This well-known canon of interpretation has been dis-
cussed and endorsed in numerous treatises on the law of treaties.149 It 
supports the proposition that the drafters of the CFE Treaty intended 
“withdrawal” to be exclusive; that is, if the parties had intended to admit 
the right to suspend the CFE Treaty, they would have made specific pro-
vision for suspension.150 
Since article XIX(2) in the CFE Treaty traces its origin to the PTBT,151 
states’ interpretation of the PTBT may be applied to the CFE Treaty. In 
fact, a U.S. State Department Legal Adviser involved in the negotiation 
of the original “Extraordinary Events” clause152 subsequently wrote that 
a “decision to end [the PTBT or NPT] very probably would require a far-
reaching realignment of the country’s foreign-policy stance.”153 He used 
the terms “end” and “termination” interchangeably with “withdrawal,” 
but never once substituted the term “suspension.”154 Indeed, “suspen-
sion,”—a measure that bars the suspending party from “acts tending to 
obstruct the resumption of the operation of the treaty”155—appears 
plainly incompatible with a provision designed to safeguard a state’s 
“supreme interests” when they become “jeopardized” by the continued 
operation of the treaty in the face of “extraordinary events.”156 Reflecting 
customary international law, the VCLT carefully divides suspension 
from other means of treaty exit, which further cautions against conflating 
“suspension” and withdrawal” in interpreting the CFE Treaty.157 To 
summarize, Russia’s “suspension” does not conform to the CFE Treaty’s 
provisions; nor is Russia’s “repudiation” 158 of it salvaged by provisions 
                                                                                                             
 148. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004). 
 149. See, e.g., ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 201 (2000); 
MARK E. VILLAGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 160 (2d. ed. 1997); 
SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 400 (2d. ed. 1916). 
 150. The CFE Treaty, including all Annexes and Protocols, is 118 pages long, suggest-
ing exhaustiveness in drafting. See CFE Treaty, supra note 1. 
 151. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 68–72. 
 152. See John Norton Moore, Enhancing Compliance With International Law: A Ne-
glected Remedy, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 881, 968 (1999) (discussing State Department Legal 
Adviser Abram Chayes’s “legal brief”). 
 153. Abram Chayes, An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 905, 963 (1972). 
 154. Id. at 962–65. 
 155. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 72(2). 
 156. See CFE Treaty, supra note 1, art. XIX(2). 
 157. See Hollis, supra note 12 (“[T]he fact that these rights come in two separate pro-
visions militates against reading the powers as interchangeable[.]”); see also discussion 
supra Part II (analyzing distinction between suspension and withdrawal). 
 158. See VCLT, supra note 42, art. 60(3)(a). 
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of the VCLT. Therefore, Russia has worked a material breach of the CFE 
Treaty. 
Russia may contend that its domestic law did not allow it to “with-
draw” from the CFE Treaty, but only to “suspend” the Treaty’s opera-
tion.159 Article 37(4) of the 1995 Federal Law of the Russian Federation 
on International Treaties of the Russian Federation provides:  
The operation of an international treaty of the Russian Federation, the 
decision concerning consent to the bindingness of which for the Rus-
sian Federation was adopted in the form of a Federal Law, may be sus-
pended by the President of the Russian Federation in instances requir-
ing the taking of urgent measures.160  
In other words, under Russian law, when urgent action is needed, “sus-
pension” of ratified treaties is the only measure available to the Russian 
President.161 However, article 27 of the VCLT holds that “[a] party may 
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure 
to perform a treaty.”162 Hence, Russia cannot get very far with an argu-
ment about domestic law restrictions. 
Although effecting a “suspension” where only a “withdrawal” was al-
lowed, Russia did comply with the notice requirements in article XIX(2) 
of the CFE Treaty: it gave 150 days advance notice, both to the Deposi-
tory and to all other States Parties, of its decision to withdraw from the 
Treaty.163 However, there may be a further basis for establishing that 
Russia has worked a “repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the 
[VCLT],”164 involving an assessment of the (in)adequacy of Russia’s 
stated grounds under the “Extraordinary Events” clause. For this pur-
pose, the clause may be divided into three elements: (1) the occurrence 
of “extraordinary events,” (2) the relation of those extraordinary events 
to “the subject matter of the treaty,” and (3) that the state’s “supreme 
national interests” have been “jeopardized.”165 
                                                                                                             
 159. See Hollis, supra note 12 (“An alternative explanation . . . may lie in Russian 
domestic legal requirements.”). 
 160. BUTLER, supra note 30, at 190 (emphasis added). The law further calls for “the 
obligatory immediate informing of the Soviet of the Federation and the State Duma and 
the submission to the State Duma of a draft respective Federal Law.” Id. 
 161. See id. at 190, 194. 
 162. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 27 (emphasis added). 
 163. See Suspension Announcement, supra note 4. 
 164. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 60(3)(a). 
 165. See Perez, supra note 61, at 776–77 (describing similar elemental breakdown of 
NPT withdrawal clause). 
1064 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3 
Although the common understanding of the clause is that each of these 
three elements is subject only to self-judging by the withdrawing state,166 
there is one instance when a state’s grounds under the clause were chal-
lenged: the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia “question[ed] 
whether the DPRK’s stated reasons for withdrawing from the [NPT] 
Treaty constitute[d] extraordinary events relating to the subject-matter of 
the Treaty.”167 Notably, this challenge included the first two elements of 
the clause, but excluded the third element.168 This suggests that only the 
third element regarding “supreme national interests” is steadfastly “self-
judging.”169 The first two elements, being more objective, are thus ame-
nable to third-party review.170 
First, it should be pointed out that Russia technically never cited “ex-
traordinary events;” rather, it enumerated six “exceptional circumstances 
that affect the security of the Russian Federation.”171 The “exceptional 
circumstances” language comes from article XXI(2) of the CFE Treaty, 
providing procedures for convening an “extraordinary conference” in 
response to a State Party’s concern about “exceptional circumstances 
relating to this Treaty.”172 In distinguishing between “extraordinary 
events” and “exceptional circumstances” under an ordinary meaning in-
terpretation of the CFE Treaty, one must conclude that “circumstances” 
refers to a set of conditions that has developed over time, whereas the 
term “events” describes distinct, episodic occurrences.173 In this regard, 
past withdrawal announcements under the clause may be instructive: in 
March 1993, the DPRK cited a U.S.-South Korean joint military exercise 
as an “extraordinary event.”174 In December 2001, the United States cited 
the September 11, 2001 attacks as an “extraordinary event.”175 Both of 
these are properly regarded as “events” rather than “circumstances.” Did 
President Putin’s announcement simply mislabel the “extraordinary 
                                                                                                             
 166. See SHAKER, supra note 69, at 898. 
 167. NPT Co-Depositories Statement, supra note 83. 
 168. See Perez, supra note 61, at 777 n.77. 
 169. But see id. at 777 (positing that “only the first two elements could be considered 
legally ‘self-judging’”). 
 170. See Cédric van Assche, Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty: A Reply, ASIL 
INSIGHTS, Sept. 2001, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh70.htm#vanassche (asserting that 
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 171. Suspension Announcement, supra note 4 (emphasis added). 
 172. CFE Treaty, supra note 1, art. XXI(2). 
 173. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 338, 616 (4th ed. 2000). 
 174. See Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 72, at 20. 
 175. See ABM Withdrawal, supra note 9. 
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events” as “exceptional circumstances,” or do Russia’s grounds for “sus-
pension” bear substantive defects? 
Russia’s first reason is cryptically translated and vague: it amounts to 
the failure of six new NATO members to make “necessary changes” in 
the “composition” of states party to the Treaty.176 The statement does not 
elaborate on the “changes” desired. While it seems to relate to the “sub-
ject matter” of the CFE Treaty, it cannot properly be regarded as an “ex-
traordinary event” since it appears to be an ongoing state of affairs. Rus-
sia’s second reason concerns the “excessive” and “exclusive” nature of 
the group of Treaty parties who are also NATO members.177 This seems 
neither to be an “extraordinary event,” as it has existed for at least the 
past two years, nor to relate to the CFE Treaty’s “subject matter.” There-
fore, the second ground is no “extraordinary event.” The third reason—
the “planned deployment of America’s conventional forces in Bulgaria 
and Romania”178—is not quite an “event” since it has not yet occurred, 
nor does it really relate to the CFE Treaty, since the United States has 
secured the consent of the two states.179 
The fourth reason provided in the Russian “suspension” announcement 
is the failure of many CFE Treaty parties to ratify the CFE Adaptation 
Agreement.180 That agreement, however, was signed in December 1999; 
for nearly eight years, all but four countries have failed to ratify the CFE 
Adaptation Agreement. The status quo can hardly be an “extraordinary 
event.” The fifth reason given is the failure of four NATO members to 
“adjust their territorial ceilings” in compliance with their “commitments 
accepted in Istanbul.”181 The same refutation given for the preceding rea-
son applies here: although it “relates” to the CFE Treaty, it is not an “ex-
traordinary event” because of its ongoing existence for this entire decade. 
Finally, Russia’s sixth reason is the Baltic countries’ (Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania) non-participation in the CFE Treaty and the difficulty that 
presents to Russian security in its northwestern region.182 In addition to 
being invalid for the reason that the state of affairs has remained static 
for years, it may be argued that this claim does not relate to the subject 
matter of the CFE Treaty, precisely because those states are not parties. 
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The foregoing analysis, though quite informal, suggests that all six of 
Russia’s grounds fail to constitute “extraordinary events” as that term’s 
ordinary meaning is reasonably understood. Moreover, some of them do 
not “relate to the subject matter” of the CFE Treaty, or do so only mar-
ginally. It is important to note that a failure under either of the two ele-
ments analyzed invalidates that reason as a ground for lawful suspension. 
Not a single justification supplied by Russia emerges intact as “extraor-
dinary events related to the subject matter” of the CFE Treaty. Hence, on 
a substantive level, Russia’s purported invocation of article XIX(2) 
amounts to “a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by [the VCLT].”183 
The principle of good faith is incorporated in the VCLT in article 26 
(Pacta sunt servanda): “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties 
to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”184 Since President 
Putin issued his statement about Russia’s intention to “suspend” the CFE 
Treaty, Russia has often declared that its move was meant to “restore the 
viability” of the treaty, that it is still very much open to negotiation, and 
that Russia does not plan to escalate its military forces in the treaty 
zone.185 Thus, Russia may wish to rely on this ostensibly treaty-
respecting behavior as a measure of its “good faith” under article 26. 
However, the countervailing consideration is that Russia has used its 
“suspension”—which has already been shown above to have been an 
illegitimate repudiation of the treaty—as a “bargaining chip” to exploit in 
its multi-dimensional diplomatic bouts with the United States, over such 
issues as ABM in Eastern Europe and the independence of Kosovo. This 
would count as a distinct absence of “good faith.” 
Furthermore, as a result of Russia’s suspension of the CFE Treaty, it 
refused to provide data on its military at “an annual information ex-
change meeting” on December 14, 2007.186 This frustrates one of the 
principal objectives of the Treaty, the promotion of transparency and co-
operation with respect to conventional weapons in Europe. Thus, Russia 
has materially breached the CFE Treaty based on the second prong of 
VCLT article 60(3): it has “violat[ed] . . . a provision essential to the ac-
complishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.”187 
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Russia may venture to ground its unilateral suspension in customary 
international law as codified in the VCLT.188 First, it may claim that its 
“suspension” was justified as an invocation of the “fundamental change 
of circumstances” doctrine.189 However, Russia would be unable to 
show, under the five-part test described above in Part IV, that the disso-
lution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact alliance was either unforeseen 
in November 1990, or that the existence of the USSR and the Warsaw 
Pact was “an essential basis”190 for the parties’ original consent to be 
bound” by the CFE Treaty.191 Russia will also be unable to rely upon 
VCLT article 60 to show that the parties to the CFE Treaty committed a 
“material breach” that entitled Russia to suspend its implementation of 
the treaty.192 None of the other States Parties had “repudiated” the CFE 
Treaty or had violated a provision “essential to the accomplishment of 
the object or purpose” of the treaty.193 Finally, impossibility of perform-
ance, as embodied in VCLT article 61, is of no use to Russia, since the 
“permanent disappearance or destruction” of the Warsaw Pact does not 
make performance of the treaty impossible in any sense.194 
CONCLUSION 
Russia’s unilateral “suspension” of the CFE Treaty—a “cornerstone of 
European security”195—cannot be legitimized under the terms of the 
Treaty itself or under customary international law. Indeed, Russia’s “re-
pudiation” of the CFE Treaty, and its violation of provisions essential to 
the treaty’s object and purpose, constitutes a material breach of the 
treaty. Russia has violated international law. 
It is important that this extralegal step by Russia not be overlooked—
and thus effectively ratified—by the international community. Russia’s 
move not only imperils the future of European arms control and security, 
but also damages the foundation of public international law: the binding 
nature of treaties. Russia cannot in good faith abandon fundamental obli-
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gations under the CFE Treaty through a “suspension” not contemplated 
either by the plain language of the treaty or by customary international 
law. Such conduct opens the way for other states to depart from binding 
treaties in a curious, ad hoc fashion. This development would undermine 
the potential stability of all treaties and make states less likely to depend 
on treaties at all on the presumption that any party was free to leave at 
any time, in any manner. 
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